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Book Review
THE CURIOUS INCIDENT OF THE LAW FIRM THAT DID NOTHING IN THE
NIGHT-TIME1
A review of Milton C. Regan, Jr, Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer
(University of Michigan Press, 2004) by Nancy B. Rapoport2
“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.3
In Eat What You Kill,4 Professor Milton Regan illustrates the lengths to which people will
go to ignore egregiously bad conduct—in effect, “d[oing] nothing in the night-time”. Regan
describes the rise and fall of John Gellene, a well-known bankruptcy lawyer who became a
federal felon.5
“[I]n December 1996 federal prosecutors in Milwaukee obtained a grand jury indictment of
Gellene. He was charged on two felony counts of making false declarations in the affidavits 
he had submitted to Judge Eisenberg. He also was charged on one felony count for using a false
Legal Ethics, Volume 10, No. 1
1 © Nancy B. Rapoport 2007. All rights reserved.
2 Gordon & Silver, Ltd. Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I owe 
special thanks to my former University of Houston Law Center research assistant, Stephen Chen, who worked tire-
lessly on this book review while finishing his undergraduate studies at the University of Texas, and whose work was
every bit as good as that of most first-year law students at any of the schools with which I have been associated. He
is now a second-year law student at UH; some smart law firm should go ahead and hire him. He also wrote a dead-
on accurate book review of this book.
I owe thanks as well to my two research assistants at Boyd, Robert Arroyo and Matt Seaton; and to Kelli Cline, Dr
Michele Follen, Jennifer Gross, Jeff Van Niel, and Morris Rapoport. Brad Wendel gets my thanks for two reasons:
because he waited so patiently for this draft and because his suggestions made it better. I also want to thank two other
groups for their very helpful comments: the faculty of the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas (comments during a presentation of a related paper over a year ago), and the students in my Enron class at St
John’s University School of Law’s LLM in Bankruptcy Program (comments made during class discussions).
3 Silver Blaze, Arthur Conan Doyle, The Complete Sherlock Holmes, Volume I (New York, Barnes & Noble
Classics, 2003), 399, 413.
4 Milton C. Regan, Jr, Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan
Press, 2004) [hereinafter Eat What You Kill].
5
“Mr. Gellene was found guilty of two counts of making false oaths in a bankruptcy proceeding, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 152(3). He was convicted specifically of ‘knowingly and fraudulently’ making false declarations
under oath in two Rule 2014 bankruptcy applications. Twice he applied for an order approving his employment
as attorney for the debtor; first, on February 18, 1994, the day he filed Bucyrus’ Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and
second, on March 28, 1994, after the hearing on his application, when he elaborated on potential conflicts of
interest, as the bankruptcy court had requested. Those applications failed to list the senior secured creditor and
related parties.”
US v Gellene, 182 F 3d 578, 585–86 (7th Cir 1999) (footnotes omitted). Gellene was also convicted of one count of
perjury: ibid, 590.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=101762750761
affidavit under oath to claim that Milbank was eligible to receive payment for its work on the
bankruptcy. Each of the first two counts carried a penalty of up to five years in prison and a
$250,000 fine. The third count was punishable by up to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine.
Any prison sentence over a year would deprive Gellene of his right to vote, his ability to be a
teacher, his eligibility to hold public office, and the opportunity to practice law. He was the first
lawyer ever charged under federal criminal law for violating Bankruptcy Rule 2014.”6
Gellene was convicted, and he served time for his misconduct.7 The law firm at which he
had been a partner—Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy (“Milbank”)—was required to dis-
gorge almost $2 million in fees and eventually settled a $100 million malpractice lawsuit.8
Eat What You Kill is a marvellous book: a cautionary tale for all lawyers and law students,
even if they will never practise bankruptcy law. There have been many interesting reviews of
this book,9 and most of them focus on Gellene’s own characteristics. Some of them focus on
the sort of pressure that high-calibre law firms put on their associates.
I’m interested in a slightly different question: what was there about Milbank that caused
the partners to overlook such warning signs as (1) Gellene’s failure to complete his paper-
work to become admitted to the New York bar, which caused him to practice without a New
York law license for several years; (2) his failure, as an experienced bankruptcy partner, to
disclose a “potential”10 conflict of interest to the bankruptcy court; (3) his failure to file
timesheets unless he was fined for non-submission; and (4) his tendency to hunker down,
take on all of the work himself, without asking for help or keeping others apprised of his
workload? How many red flags did Milbank need to understand that Gellene was a liability
as well as an asset?11 In other words, was Milbank’s failure to rid itself of Gellene an isolated
instance of greed overcoming common sense, or was the failure a more systemic problem of
how people in organisations behave?
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6 Eat What You Kill, supra n. 4, 3.
7 Ibid, 287.
8 M.C. Regan, Jr, “Taking Law Firms Seriously” (2002) 16 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 155, 160.
9 See, eg, A.V. Alfieri, “The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management” (2006) 94 Georgetown Law
Journal 1909; S. Lubet, “False Flats” (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 275; M.A. Sargent, “The Moral
World of Corporate Lawyers” (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 289; P.C. Saunders, “When
Compensation Creates Culture” (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 295; T. Rostain, “Partners and Power:
The Role of Law Firm Organizational Factors in Attorney Misconduct” (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal
Ethics 281 [hereinafter Rostain]; W.H. Simon, “The Ethics Teacher’s Bittersweet Revenge: Virtue and Risk
Management” (2006) 94 Georgetown  Law Journal 1985; W.B. Wendel, “Ethical Lawyering in a Morally Dangerous
World” (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 299 [hereinafter Wendel].
10 The conflict in question was more than “potential”; it was real.
11 Gellene’s tragic story—and Milbank’s steadfast refusal to fire someone who had significant problems comply-
ing with law firm policy, the New York bar’s requirements for admission, legal ethics generally, and the bankruptcy
ethics rules relating to disclosure of conflicts—reminds me of the song we sing at Passover, Dayenu. See, eg,
http://www.greatjewishmusic.com/Midifiles/Passover/Dayenu.htm. The point of Dayenu is that each gift that
God gave us would have been sufficient in and of itself, but God kept giving us more and more. Gellene’s (and
Milbank’s) story is a sort of anti-Dayenu: had Milbank fired Gellene when it discovered that he had been repre-
senting himself as a duly admitted New York lawyer, dayenu; had Milbank fired Gellene when it realised that the
only way to force him to turn in a timesheet was to impose thousands of dollars in monthly fines, dayenu; had
Milbank fired Gellene when it noticed that Gellene never, ever took time to participate in the summer associate
mentorship program that he had agreed to do, dayenu (although I don’t know of any firm that would fire someone
just for that infraction); had Milbank fired Gellene after several annual reviews pointed out that he kept all of his
work to himself, worked like a madman, and didn’t ask for help, dayenu. By the time Milbank found out that it was
going to lose (by default) a motion to disgorge $2 million in fees if it didn’t act fast, it was too late.
I believe that Milbank’s failure to act was a sort of co-dependency and that there are count-
less incidents of “ethical lapse” co-dependency in organisations, caused12 not by simple
greed, but by a combination of psychological and sociological factors that cause very bright
people to do some very stupid things. John Gellene’s story is but one example; Jeff Skilling,
Andy Fastow and Ken Lay of Enron provide other examples. History is replete with such
examples. The American Bar Association (with ethics codes) and Congress often will react
by attempting to legislate better behaviour. Unfortunately, no amount of legislation is going
to save us from the foibles of human nature. Until we understand the effects that cognitive
dissonance, the diffusion of responsibility,13 and social pressure14 have on the human psy-
che, we can legislate behaviour until the cows15 come home and we’ll still see no changes in
the way that people in organisations handle even the most glaring misbehaviour.
I. Enron and the Human Condition
Many people have studied Enron,16 and most point to a combination of loopholes in the legal
and business worlds to explain what went wrong. After obsessing about Enron for years,
though, I believe that the exploitation of loopholes was only a symptom of the problem, not
a cause. Instead, I believe that human nature—especially that part of human nature that plays
mind games, such as cognitive dissonance, diffusion of responsibility, and social pressure—
created the problems at Enron.
a. Cognitive Dissonance Generally
Although several academics have studied cognitive dissonance, Leon Festinger first defined
it as
“[t]he psychological opposition of irreconcilable ideas (cognitions) held simultaneously by one
individual, created a motivating force that would lead, under proper conditions, to the adjust-
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12 These incidents may be exacerbated by greed, but they aren’t caused by greed.
13
“Partly in response to the highly publicized inaction of thirty-eight alleged witnesses of the death of Kitty
Genovese in 1964, psychologists have conducted hundreds of field studies of helping behavior among
strangers. Some of these focus on personal characteristics, such as age or sex, of the potential helper. Others
focus on situational variables, such as how burdensome providing help would be. These sorts of studies can
illuminate both what sorts of socialization processes abet altruism, and also how willing a well socialized per-
son would be to trade off rectitude for, say, personal safety. Research along these lines might help rational-
actor theorists decide in which people, in which situations, and in what quantities, to alloy the self-interest
model with a dollop of altruism.”
R.C. Ellickson, “Symposium on Post-Chicago Law and Economics: Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics” (1989) 65 Chicago-Kent Law Review 23, 47–48 (foot-
notes omitted). Cf J.J. Rachlinski, “Symposium on Law, Psychology, and the Emotions: The Limits of Social
Norms” (2000) 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1537, 1556. (“Neither was Kitty Genovese really the victim of a cal-
lous, urban social norm. Rather, the presence of a passive group affected the bystander’s interpretation of
Genovese’s plight.”)
14 See, eg, S. Asch, “Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments” in Readings
in Social Psychology 2 (G. Swanson, T. Newcomb, E. Hartley et al (eds), New York, Holt, 1952); K.S. Larsen, “The
Asch Conformity Experiment: Replication and Transhistorical Comparisons” (1990) 5 Journal of  Social Behavior
and Personality 163. 
15 Cf text accompanying n. 23, infra.
16 Including me. See N.B. Rapoport and B.G. Dharan (eds), Enron: Corporate Fiascos and their Implications (New
York, Foundation Press, 2004) [hereinafter Corporate Fiascos].
ment of one’s belief to fit one’s behavior—instead of changing one’s behavior to fit one’s belief
(the sequence conventionally assumed).”17
In short, cognitive dissonance is the mind’s creation of a justification that can explain how a
good person can do something very, very bad. Cognitive dissonance tells us that, because the
human mind can’t tolerate acting in a way that contradicts a person’s positive self-image, a
person who does something unethical or immoral will come up with a “logical” explanation
for that behaviour. These explanations run the gamut, justifying everything from adultery
(“if my spouse weren’t distant, I wouldn’t cheat”) to embezzlement (“I’ll pay it back tomor-
row, and no one’s being hurt”) to murder (“he made me kill him”).
One of Festinger’s experiments involved asking a group of people to lie. He divided that
group into two subgroups—one of the subgroups received $20 in exchange for telling the lie,
and the other group received $1 in exchange for telling the lie. Festinger found that the mem-
bers of the $1 payment group were
“far more likely to claim, after the fact, that they really believed the lie, than those who’d earned
the twenty dollars. Why would that be? Festinger hypothesized that it is much harder to justify
lying for a dollar; you are a good, smart person after all, and good, smart people don’t do bad
things for no real reason. Therefore, because you can’t take back the lie, and you’ve already pock-
eted the measly money, you bring your beliefs into alignment with your actions, so as to reduce
the dissonance between your self-concept and your questionable behavior. However, those folks
who were paid twenty dollars to lie, they didn’t change their beliefs; in effect they said, ‘Yeah, 
I lied, I didn’t believe a word of what I said, but I got paid well.’ The twenty-dollar subjects
experienced less dissonance; they could find a compelling justification for their fibs, and that jus-
tification had double-digits and a crisp snap.”18
According to Festinger’s theory, the smaller the payment, the more likely the creation of cog-
nitive dissonance.19
When I lecture about cognitive dissonance, I usually illustrate the theory by observing that
only the theory of cognitive dissonance can explain why someone would go on a second date
after the first date was horrendous. To explain the action of choosing to go out on date #2,
the corresponding thought must be “I am a very good judge of people, so if I’m going out on
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17 L. Slater, Opening Skinner’s Box: Great Psychological Experiments of the Twentieth Century (New York, 
W.W. Norton, 2004), 113 (2004) [hereinafter Slater] (citing L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1957)).
18 Slater, ibid, 117–118. In other words, cognitive dissonance occurs when someone doesn’t want to admit that
he did something bad for a bad reason (ie, flat-out greed); instead, he’ll “justify” his decision in order to believe that
he did something objectively “bad” for a “good” reason. Who wants to say that he can be bought for a mere dollar?
On the other hand, who among us can say that he will not be bought for any price?
19 Ibid, 118. I don’t intend to discuss all of the literature on cognitive dissonance here. Other and better scholars
have done that, and they have applied cognitive dissonance theory to lawyer behaviour in far more elegant ways than
I can. See, eg, D.J. Luban, “The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience” in D.L. Rhode (ed), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’
Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation (New York, Oxford University Press, 2000). But even a cursory discussion of
cognitive dissonance comes up with some unusual examples: the experiment by Landis in 1924, finding that 71 per
cent of subjects in his sample would chop off a rat’s head if the experimenter asked them to do so; the experiment by
Frank in 1944, in which subjects would do pretty much whatever the experimenter requested as long as the experi-
menter wore a white lab coat while making his request; Asch’s superb experiment in which a group of actors could
persuade an experiment’s subject to disbelieve his own eyes and concur with the group’s (wrong) conclusion about
the length of some lines on paper; and, of course, Stanley Milbank’s experiments using a fake electric shock machine
to test his subjects’ willingness to electrocute total strangers. Slater, supra n. 17, 41–48. To see some film of the sub-
jects in Milgram’s experiment, see Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2005).
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a second date with this person after the first date was so miserable, it’s because I believe that
the person’s behavior on date #1 was an aberration”. People laugh at that example, but it’s a
very small step from that example to why someone might stay in an abusive relationship:
“I’m not a masochist, so I must be with this person because the destructive behavior is not
the ‘real’ him.”
b. Cognitive Dissonance at Enron
I’ve written before about the cognitive dissonance at Enron.20 Since the publication of our
Enron book,21 Andy Fastow and Jeff Skilling have begun serving time in federal prison, and
Ken Lay likely would have joined them, but for his untimely death in 2005. Even though we
know that not everyone who worked at Enron was a crook, a liar, or a cheat, we also know—
or at least we have a reasonable understanding—that several of the deals were designed to
generate the appearance of profits at the end of quarters or fiscal years.22 As one classic Enron
joke explains,
“Enron Capitalism: You have two cows. You sell three of them to your publicly listed company,
using letters of credit opened by your brother-in-law at the bank, then execute a debt-equity swap
with an associated general offer so that you get all four cows back, with a tax exemption for five
cows. The milk rights of the six cows are transferred through an intermediary to a Cayman Island
company secretly owned by the majority shareholder who sells the rights to all seven cows back
to your listed company. The Enron annual report says the company owns eight cows, with an
option on one more.”23
In deal after deal, quarter after quarter, Enron was milking its fictitious cows for all they were
ostensibly worth. There are several theories proposed to explain the behaviour of Enron’s
officers and directors. Congress tended to explain the behaviour as simple, unbridled
greed,24 and it tried to create negative incentives to offset this greed with Sarbanes-Oxley.25
Others have suggested that Enron used political power to change the checks and balances on
its accounting measures, as when Wendy Gramm’s work at the Commodity Futures Trade
Commission allowed Enron to use mark-to-market accounting on its energy deals.26
Enron’s misdeeds weren’t due to an absence of collective intelligence, because Enron regu-
larly hired the best and the brightest (as did the late accounting firm Arthur Andersen).27 As
20 See, eg, “Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm” in Corporate Fiascos, supra n. 16, 927.
21 Ibid.
22 See J.D. Van Niel and N.B. Rapoport, “Dr Jekyll & Mr Skilling: How Enron’s Public Image Morphed From
the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most Notorious Company Ever”, in Corporate Fiascos, supra
n. 16, 77, 80–83.
23 http://politicalhumor.about.com/library/blenronomics.htm (visited 18 September 2007).
24 148 Cong Rec H5462-02, H5466 (25 July 2002).
25 Ibid, H5464; Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub L No 107–204,
116 Stat 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 USC (2000)).
26 See, eg, T. Fleck and B. Wallstin, “Enron’s End Run: To make a mess as big as the Enron debacle, you need
some friends in high places—Texas Senator Phil Gramm and his wife, for instance” Dallas Observer, 7 February
2002. Mark-to-market accounting isn’t a problem when the “market” to which the contract’s estimated profits are
accelerated and recorded in year one is a real market, with the ability to verify the calculation of those profits. Where
Enron went wrong was in creating both the deal and the market itself, which allowed it to manipulate both sides of
the equation: the contract’s calculated profit and the market that set that profit.
27 Although Andersen’s appeal of certain of the jury instructions to the United States Supreme Court was suc-
cessful, Arthur Andersen v United States, 544 US 696 (2005), the decision came too late to save Andersen from
destruction.
authors from Daniel Goleman28 to Peter Salovey and John Mayer29 have pointed out, though,
IQ is not necessarily linked to EQ (emotional intelligence). IQ can tell a businessperson how
to manipulate the rules to her advantage; EQ can tell her why she shouldn’t do it.
A perfect example of Enron’s failure to encourage more ethical decision-making is its
exploitation of California’s then-existing regulatory structure for round-trip electricity trad-
ing. According to several sources,30 Enron traders shipped excess electricity out of California
and then encouraged power plants to create false outages. Then, when California needed the
electricity again, Enron31 was able to import the out-of-California electricity at exorbitantly
high prices.32 The scheme looked something like this:33
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28 See D.P. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (New York, Bantam Books, 2006); C. Cherniss and D. Goleman
(eds), The Emotionally Intelligent WorkPlace (San Francisco, Jossey Bass, 2001); D.P. Goleman, Working With
Emotional Intelligence (New York, Bantam Books, 1998). 
29 P. Salovey, J. Mayer and M. Brackett, Emotional Intelligence: Key Readings on the Mayer and Salovey Model
(Portchester, NY, Dude, 2004).   
30 See M. Lifsher and E. Douglass, “The Enron Verdicts: Californians See Poetic Justice” LA Times, 26 May
2006, A1; T. Egan, “Tapes Show Enron Arranged Plant Shutdown” NY Times, 4 February 2005, A12.
31 Other energy companies apparently also engaged in this sort of market manipulation.
32 R.A. Oppel, Jr, “Enron’s Many Strands; The Strategies: How Enron Got California To Buy Power It Didn’t
Need” NY Times, 8 May 2002, C1; M.W. Lynch and A. Moore, “Power Tripped: Energy Crisis, California”,
Reason, 1 June 2001, 33.
33 J.D. Van Niel, “Enron—The Primer” in Corporate Fiascos, supra n. 16, 3, 22.

























California PX sells power to Enron, who ships power to out-of-state entity. 
Shortage of  power in California triggers buying obligation by ISO, which shops for 
power out of  state. Enron waits until prices peak on the California Grid, has the 
out-of-state entity ship power back to Enron, who then re-sells the same power 
back to ISO for up to 20 times the price that was paid that same day to bring the 
power out of  California. The out-of-state entity charged Enron a fee to take power 
and return it in the same day.
Was the scheme legal? Had Enron not manipulated the supply of electricity out of, and then
back into, California, then the answer is “sure”: Enron was simply pricing the electricity so
as to benefit its own shareholders. But was it ethical? Not by any stretch of the imagination.34
Ask anyone who lived through the rolling brownouts of the California energy crisis.
Let’s assume, though, that some of the people at Enron actually agonised over the
“round-tripping” of electricity in California, as well as over Enron’s business losses and the
ridiculous deals designed to cover them up. In fact, there were many who expressed their
unease regarding those deals.35 So then why did these smart people facilitate those deals, by
participating in them36 or by remaining silent about them?37
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34 Had Enron (allegedly) not manipulated the demand for electricity by agreements, then the question of whether
Enron’s round-trip trading was ethical is much more difficult. Lawyers are supposed to find gaps and, yes, loop-
holes in regulations for the benefit of their clients. Still, the enormous profits generated by round-trip trading raise
a related question: is there such a thing as too much profit?
35 See generally M. Swartz and S. Watkins, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron (New York,
Doubleday, 2003); see also Watkins’ email to Lay, available at http://www.itmweb.com/f012002.htm.
36 One possibility is that these very smart people had very poor moral reasoning skills. Maybe part of the prob-
lem at Enron was created by the relative youth of many of the key players: see, eg, “Key Enron Executives’
Penalties” Washington Post, 14 December 2006, D1; J.S. Emshwiller, “‘Benron’ Behind Bars; An inside look at the
life of Ben Glisan, Jr, the first Enron executive to go to jail” Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2007, A1, as well as a con-
comitant lag in their moral reasoning abilities: see R. Kegan, In Over our Heads: the Mental Demands of Modern Life
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998). My very-uneducated guess would place Fastow (and many of
his colleagues) in stages one or two of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning scale. 
According to Kohlberg, moral reasoning progresses in relatively well-defined stages. In stage one, people decide
to do or not do an act merely out of a desire to avoid punishment. See N.B. Rapoport, “Lord of the Flies (1963): The
Development of Rules Within an Adolescent Culture” in R. Strickland, T. Foster and T. Banks (eds), Screening
Justice—The Cinema of Law: Fifty Significant Films of Law, Order and Social Justice, (Buffalo, William S. Hein & Co,
2005) [hereinafter Flies]. Stage two decisions represent a détente or a quid pro quo between actors. See M.D. Daneker,
“Moral Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy” (1993) 43 American University Law Review 49, 54 [hereinafter
Daneker]; cf C. Gilligan et al (eds), Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of Women’s Thinking to Psychological
Theory and Education (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1988) [hereinafter Mapping]; C. Gilligan,
“Getting Civilized’ (1994) 63 Fordham Law Review 17; C. Menkel-Meadow, “What’s Gender Got To Do With It?:
The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of Care” (1995) 22 New YorkUniversity Review of Law and Social Change 265,
276 and n. 39 (reviewing J.C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York,
Routledge, 1993)); see also P.S. Karlan and D.R. Ortiz, “In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights,
and the Feminist Legal Agenda” (1993) 87 Northwestern University Law Review 858, 863, 870 (contrasting Kohlberg’s
theory of moral development with Gilligan’s theory). Only after stage two does the concept of a social contract—a
higher power than the relationship between two actors—start to come into play. In stage three, people enforce rules
because the rules exist. The difference between stage three and stage four reasoning is that, in stage three, society
enforces the rules because they exist: see Daneker, 54–55; in stage four (the “law and order” stage), society enforces
the rules because the rules have been enacted by majority rule, which provides an independent rationale for the
“rightness” of those rules: ibid, 55. Stage five reasoning goes beyond majority rule to an articulable theory of rights
(eg, natural law): ibid, 56, which allows stage five actors to factor in the rights of the minority: ibid. And the final stage,
stage six, uses “universal ethical principles” to help the actor decide how to behave: ibid, 56 (footnotes omitted). 
Once Enron started on its downhill track, by making riskier and more complicated deals in order to cover up its
business failures, its executives were faced with a Hobbesian dilemma: take the losses, make the charges against earn-
ings public and reap the consequences, or come up with Rube Goldberg-like deals to disguise its problems. See 
M. Flood, “Glisan Chips Away at Lay, Skilling Defense” Houston Chronicle, 23 March 2006, A1. (In all likelihood,
Fastow’s machinations enabled Enron to stay afloat far longer than it would have if Enron had come clean about its
business failures at the time that the failures occurred.) I think that it’s fair to assume that stage three–stage six rea-
soning didn’t occur. In fact, I think that the key players at Enron stayed solidly in stage one. If the only reason to
obey the rules is to avoid punishment, and if one discounts the risk of punishment by the likelihood of getting
caught, then choosing to ignore the rules is a logical outgrowth of stage one reasoning. B. McLean and P. Elkind
didn’t name their book The Smartest Guys in the Room by accident. See The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing
Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (New York, Portfolio, 2003).
37 “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” Quotation attributed to
Edmond Burke. See http://www.bartleby.com/66/18/9118.html, but see http://forum.quoteland.com/1/ 
c. Diffusion of Responsibility at Enron
Part of the answer must lie with the very human tendency to assume that “someone else” is
taking care of the problem. The Powers Report to the Enron Board is a perfect example: the
board blamed the accountants and the lawyers for Enron’s downfall; the lawyers blamed the
board and the accountants; and the accountants blamed the lawyers and the board.38 None
of these groups took responsibility for Enron’s actions.
The classic example of diffusion of responsibility involves Kitty Genovese’s murder on a
warm, New York summer evening.39 Genovese’s murder took a long time to complete, and
many people in many nearby apartments heard her cries for help, but no one called the
police—on the assumption that someone else hearing her cries certainly must have called the
authorities.40 With everyone hoping that someone else was taking action, no one took any
responsibility himself.
So it went at Enron. Various employees were uncomfortable with the shaky deals that
Fastow and Skilling proposed,41 but there are few examples of anyone at Enron calling
“shenanigans”42 on those deals. Sherron Watkins, in her now-famous memo, tried to get
Ken Lay to own up to Enron’s misdeeds—not because she was acting as a whistleblower,
which she wasn’t, but because she believed that Lay had not been involved in Enron’s
machinations. My guess is that Fastow et al counted on this facet of human nature in struc-
turing the deals. Certainly Skilling’s “rank and yank” reviews of Enron employees encour-
aged people to keep their heads down and their opinions to themselves, as did the amount of
fees going to the professionals representing Enron. But neither cognitive dissonance nor dif-
fusion of responsibility can provide a complete explanation of what went wrong at Enron.
d. Social Pressure at Enron
Social pressure played a large role in Enron’s ability to keep its shady deals quiet. In Solomon
Asch’s famous experiment,43 various actors were able to persuade the experimental subjects
that the line that the subjects thought was identical to another line wasn’t identical—even
though the two lines were, in fact, exactly the same length.44
Even though the actors in the experiment were clearly wrong, the subject conformed to the
social pressure in order to alleviate his own anxiety about the misidentification. If a subject can
conform in a low-stakes situation, what likelihood was there that an Enron worker who
“knew” that the deals weren’t generating real money was going to speak out? Was someone at
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J.C. Coffee, Jr, “Understanding Enron: ‘It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid’ ”, reprinted in Corporate Fiascos, supra
n. 16, 125–143.
39 “Queens Woman is Stabbed to Death in Front of Home” NY Times, 14 March 1964, 26.
40 M. Gansberg, “Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police” NY Times, 27 March 1964.
41 Swartz and Watkins, supra n. 35, 131–132; see also R. Bryce, Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego, and the Death of Enron
(Oxford, Public Affairs, 2002); B. Cruver, Anatomy of Greed: The Unshredded Truth from an Enron Insider (Carroll
& Graf, 2002); The Crooked E: The Unshredded Truth about Enron (CBS television broadcast, 5 January 2003).
42 Cf South Park: Cow Days (Comedy Central television broadcast, 30 September 1998) (Kyle calls “shenani-
gans” on a rigged carnival game). Brava to Jennifer Gross for finding this source.
43 Asch, supra n. 14.
44 See n. 14, supra.
Enron likely to say that the Dabhol power plant in India could never generate a profit, or that
Azurix in Houston was mathematically incapable of making money? Hardly.
Cognitive dissonance kept the lawyers, the accountants, the employees, and the board
from recognising that they had crossed the line repeatedly in their ill-fated attempts to keep
Enron afloat. Even when they knew that something about the deals wasn’t kosher, a combin-
ation of social pressure and diffusion of responsibility may have kept many of them from
speaking out. Enron isn’t unique—as the misadventures at WorldCom,45 Tyco,46 Global
Crossing,47 Hewlett-Packard,48 Brocade,49 and Dell50 (among others) demonstrate. Milbank
wasn’t unique, either.51
II. Gellene, Milbank, and the Human Condition
What makes Eat What You Kill so interesting is its description of how Gellene’s own inse-
curities managed to combine with Milbank’s cavalier disregard for clear warning signs, thus
creating a train wreck that sent Gellene to prison and Milbank to its malpractice insurer.
Regan offers the two “prevailing explanations”:
“The first is that Gellene was a moral rogue, an aberrant partner with a weakness for cutting 
corners when it suited his purposes. The second is that Gellene was the fall guy, someone pres-
sured by his firm to conceal a conflict of interest so that Milbank could reap a reward of almost
$2 million in fees. From this perspective, Gellene was done in by a corrupt organization. The
first explanation blames Gellene’s fall on flawed character; the second depicts him as the victim
of circumstances that he couldn’t resist.”52
Of course, each explanation is incomplete. Neither “the person” nor “the situation” is the
only explanation; rather, it’s the synergistic combination of character and context that
explains it.
a. Law Firms—The Context
To understand why Milbank overlooked Gellene’s clear ethical lapses, Eat What You Kill
quite correctly begins with the social pressures that modern law firms face. Regan describes
the three features of modern law firm life:
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“Focusing on these questions directs attention to three features that are common to practice in
modern large law firms. First, a shift to merit-based compensation and away from job security
means that partners as well as associates are competitors in a tournament [that never ceases, even
after someone becomes a partner] . . .
. . . The common way to describe this system in the large firm is that you “eat what you kill”.
There are two main ways to be an entrepreneur who can compete successfully in a tournament
organized around this principle. The first, and preferable, way is to be a “rainmaker”: someone who
develops contacts with clients that lead to regular business. The second is to cultivate a good rela-
tionship with a rainmaker, thereby gaining access to the work that his or her clients generate.”53
In essence, then, the larger the law firm, the more important one’s practice peers are in 
setting the social norms for that practice. Especially because the largest firms are, quite sim-
ply, too large to monitor everyone, life in large firms is lived at the departmental level, not
the firm-wide level. And it was in the bankruptcy department that Gellene found himself,
complete with a rainmaker (Larry Lederman) who needed a workhorse (Gellene).
“The particular move that ultimately begat the Gellene scandal was an effort to specialize in the
representation of large corporate debtors in the bankruptcy reorganization process. Milbank had
bankruptcy experience, but did most of its work on behalf of individual creditors: steady piece-
work, but not highly profitable. Directing reorganization on behalf of a large debtor, on the other
hand, was a major project that could yield huge fees, ordered by the bankruptcy court and payable
off the top of the estate. To move into this niche, it hired Larry Lederman, a “rainmaker” from
the mergers and acquisitions powerhouse Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and gave him a free
hand to wheel and deal. Gellene . . . saw Lederman as his ticket to continued success in the tour-
nament. Economic pressures worked in grotesque synergy with his own psychological problems
as Gellene committed his bizarre crime. Since even rainmakers are only a bad year away from
unemployment, Lederman felt the same pressures. Consequently, when Gellene obliquely raised
the possibility of a conflict on at least one occasion, Lederman either missed the point or chose
to ignore it.54
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J.M. Conley and S. Baker, “Fall From Grace or Business as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street
and Main Street” (2005) 30 Law and Social Inquiry 783, 798 [hereinafter Fall From Grace].
54 Fall from Grace, ibid, 799–800.
I’m not the first (or the best) person to apply social science principles to Gellene’s 
(and Milbank’s) downfall.55 But few people have taken that analysis beyond Gellene’s own
characteristics to view Milbank’s complicity in his behaviour, or to compare Milbank’s inac-
tion with the inaction that occurred at Enron. In order to understand how the situation at
Milbank compared with the situation at Enron, we must still first examine how Gellene 
signalled that Milbank should have kept a closer watch on him.
b. What were Gellene’s Signals to Milbank?
By all accounts, Gellene was a loner and an insanely hard worker.56 And Milbank was aware
of both of these characteristics, much as it was aware that Gellene didn’t pay attention to the
non-billable aspects of firm life. Even something as mundane as filling out his timesheets on
a regular basis was apparently beneath Gellene, who was routinely as late as a month in turn-
ing them in.57 Mentoring and recruiting functions also weren’t his forte.58 In sum, Gellene
was a keep-his-head-down, focus-on-the-task-at-hand kind of lawyer: not unusual at a large
firm, but perhaps more pathological than most.
When I say “pathological,” I mean that Gellene was off the deep end in terms of under-
standing how his actions might relate to his professional conduct. Not every partner who
submits very late timesheets needs psychological help, but every partner (or associate) who
does so must recognise that he can’t possibly recreate his timesheets accurately. Law firms
tend to view slow timesheet submission as an accounting problem. I disagree. I view it as an
ethics problem: late timesheets necessarily mean that the lawyer must “guess” how much
time he spent on every matter, and thus those timesheets either underbill or overbill59 the
clients. No matter on which side of the coin the “guesstimates” land, the end result is the
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Eat What You Kill, supra n. 4, 53–54 (emphasis added).
57 Ibid.
58 “. . . In a similar vein, the head of the firm’s summer associate program reported in 1992 that Gellene had been
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Ibid.
59 One of the problems with late timesheets is that every lawyer could easily make both types of mistakes: under-
billing and overbilling. A lawyer will underbill when he forgets to bill for a matter on which he worked. The same
lawyer will overbill when he recreates a late timesheet along the following lines:  “well, I worked on this matter for
seven days straight, and I probably put in ten-hour days, so I’ll bill 70 hours for this matter.” The odds are good that
the lawyer didn’t actually fill the entirety of those days with billable work. Underbilling cheats the law firm out of
earned fees. Overbilling cheats the client—period.
same: the lawyer has lied about how he spent his time. And lies have an annoying tendency
to multiply.60
Milbank was aware of something else about Gellene, at least after Gellene became a part-
ner: he was practising in New York without a license.
“Only a few months after earning partnership on January 1, 1989, [Gellene’s] achievement was
in jeopardy. In late May of that year, Milbank was conducting a routine check of the credentials
of all its lawyers. It confirmed that he was a member of the New Jersey bar. The firm discovered
however, that, contrary to his representation, Gellene was not listed as a member by the New
York state bar. This in turn meant that his putative membership in the federal bar in New York
City was invalid. In other words, for almost nine years Gellene had practiced law in New York
without a license. When confronted with this discrepancy, Gellene did not immediately confirm
that Milbank’s information was correct. Eventually, however, he admitted that he had never com-
pleted the steps necessary to become a member of the New York bar.61
The portrait of Gellene thus falls into sharper focus: he was a loner, an insanely hard worker,
and someone who believed that certain rules didn’t apply to him. As Gellene’s story unfolds,
Milbank would also find out that Gellene was someone who would fail to disclose a conflict
of interest to a court, fail to respond to a motion to disgorge fees in that case (the Bucyrus case)
and, until he was cornered, fail to provide his fellow partners with undoctored versions of
pleadings filed against him and the firm.
c. Cognitive Dissonance at Milbank62
If Gellene had so many problems, why did Milbank keep him on, first as an associate and then
later as a partner? The likely answer is that Gellene was enough of a billing machine that he
was profitable.63 At some point, though, profit isn’t enough of an answer.
Take Gellene’s failure to take the time to complete his character and fitness requirements
for the New York bar. That failure probably stemmed from the same tunnel vision that he
had exhibited throughout his career. Milbank knew about Gellene’s problems with his
timesheets and with abandoning summer associates, and perhaps it could dismiss such mis-
takes as “merely internal” problems; however, Gellene’s practice of law without a license cre-
ated a problem externally for the firm.64 The firm had tolerated other associates’ failure to
complete their character and fitness portions of bar applications,65 so it would not have been
unreasonable for Gellene to assume that the firm would tolerate his delay as well. And it did,
in a manner of speaking.
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Gellene completed his application and was sworn in some ten months after Milbank 
originally discovered the problem. The only action that Milbank took was to demote Gellene
to “of counsel” for the rest of the year; Milbank reinstated him as a partner, but in a newer-
partner compensation bracket, which rankled Gellene considerably.
What rationale could the management at Milbank give itself for retaining Gellene as a part-
ner after realising that he had knowingly practised for years without a New York licence? As
Tanina Rostain correctly observes, “A fundamental purpose of law firm discipline should be to
address the organizational factors, and specifically the dynamics of power, that contribute to
individual wrongdoing”.66 Gellene wasn’t the first Milbank lawyer who had neglected to fin-
ish the paperwork for admission to the New York bar. Why did Milbank look the other way,
not just in Gellene’s case, but in several Milbank lawyers’ situations? One explanation is that
Milbank was reluctant to admit that hiring Gellene (and the other lawyers) could have been a
mistake. By rationalising that Gellene had, ultimately, been admitted to the New York bar,
Milbank could say that the delay in admission was merely due to overwork.
If my hypothesis is correct, Milbank certainly wouldn’t be the only law firm that might
pride itself on its sweatshop-like work conditions. Many (most?) of the largest firms use bill-
able hours as a way to measure their associates’ work ethic. It’s a race to exhaustion, a race to
sloppiness, and a race to malpractice, but it’s a very macho race, nonetheless. And macho
behaviour is the norm at the top firms.67
d. Diffusion of Responsibility
Another problem endemic to organisations is diffusion of responsibility. Think how many
Milbank partners knew about Gellene’s foibles generally, and how few of them took action.
Regan describes the scene at Milbank when Gellene’s partners discovered that he had not
replied to the disgorgement motion in Bucyrus:
“Lichstein [one of Gellene’s partners] was piqued that Lederman and Gellene had downplayed her
earlier inquiries about a potential conflict. She suggested to Lederman that perhaps they should have
taken her more seriously. Gellene nonetheless appeared composed during the meeting. He did not
talk about the specifics of the JNL motion [for disgorgement of fees in the Bucyrus case]. . . . A
response to the motion, he said, was due that coming Friday, February 28. He gave no indication of
any problems with the response. The other Milbank partners apparently left the meeting feeling
reassured that Gellene was on top of the situation, and that there was no danger to the firm.
After the meeting, Lichstein continued to ask Gellene for the full set of papers associated with
the motion. She would be happy, she said, to help with the response. Gellene said that he would
prepare a draft response the next day, which she could then review before it was filed on Friday.
As the day went on, Lichstein’s exasperation mounted as her repeated calls to Gellene failed to
result in receipt of the papers. At one point, Lichstein enlisted Barist [another partner] and asked
for his help. Barist called Gellene, but the latter was not in his office.
Finally, late that afternoon Lichstein sat down to read closely the only document she had, the
memorandum of law. She was surprised by the fact that it referred to an accompanying affidavit
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of Andy Rahl dated December 12, 1996. That’s odd, she thought. Why would a motion that had
been filed in February be accompanied by an affidavit executed two months earlier? Lichstein
then asked David Gelfand [another partner] to go up to Gellene’s office to get a copy of the full
set of papers. Gelfand had no more luck than she had, and came back empty-handed. Finally,
early that evening, Lichstein phoned Gellene in his office and asked why the Rahl affidavit was
dated in December. Gellene said that he would come down to talk to Lichstein and Gelfand.
Gellene was quite distraught when he entered Lichstein’s office. As Gelfand put it, ‘[W]hat
happened next was a very difficult thing to witness.’ Gellene broke down in front of his col-
leagues. He felt terrible, he said, but he couldn’t lie to Lichstein and Gelfand any longer. He said
that the JNL motion papers had actually been served on him in December 1996, and that he had
later received a second set of papers filed on behalf of Bucyrus. He explained why the memo-
randum that he had given Lichstein had no date on the signature page: Gellene had whited it
out. . . . [Gellene] had sought an extension of time to file a response [to the two motions]. The
court, however, had denied his request. As a result, he had missed the deadline by about two
weeks. Milbank thus faced the prospect that [the court] would rule that the firm had to return
almost $2 million to Bucyrus.
David Gelfand undertook a preliminary investigation of the matter on behalf of the firm.
Milbank eventually called in the law firm of Sidley Austin to handle the matter. The February
14 deadline for responding to the JNL and Bucyrus motions had passed. Gelfand, however, pre-
pared an affidavit stating that no one at the firm other than Gellene had been aware of the
motions. The court then granted Milbank an extension of the time to reply until March 21.68
The motion to disgorge was, I believe, inevitable, based on Gellene’s habit of playing
things close to the vest. For a long time, Milbank had tolerated Gellene’s habits, and even
rewarded them: he wasn’t fired after the firm discovered that he had been practising without
a licence; he was fined a pittance when he turned in timesheets chronically late; and he was
allowed to run large bankruptcy cases virtually by himself. What else could Milbank have
expected would happen, given the extraordinary pressures that Gellene—and everyone else
at Milbank—was under?
Milbank isn’t an isolated firm, populated with bad actors. It is a large law firm, and it is
run—like other law firms—by lawyers, few of whom have had any training as managers.
Most law firms operate at a breakneck pace, with precious little time for thought about client
matters, let alone law firm matters. I wouldn’t be a bit surprised to find that the lawyers who
worked with Gellene assumed that the firm either (1) knew about what was happening and
was taking care of it, or (2) knew about what was happening and quietly approved of it. I also
wouldn’t be surprised to find out that the firm’s management assumed that lawyers working
more closely with Gellene would have alerted firm management if they thought that anything
was amiss. After all, what behaviour counts as normal in such a fast-paced environment?
e. Social Pressure
To the extent that Milbank, like other large law firms, is organised into departments by prac-
tice groups, those departments create powerful incentives to conform to practice group
norms. In bankruptcy groups, for example, conflicts of interest can be interpreted very dif-
ferently from how they would be interpreted in, say, commercial litigation departments, or
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in tax departments, etc.69 Without input from other departments, there is a risk that the
departmental group norms will override any firm-wide (or professional) norms.
“The result of all this is that teams can shape individual perceptions in powerful ways by creat-
ing a shared cognitive and moral universe. Members reinforce for one another the idea that their
framework for interpreting events is accurate and reasonable. This process can result in 
‘groupthink’, a situation in which individuals arrive at a consensus without exploring all options
or paying enough attention to information that challenges their framework. Group influence will
be especially pronounced when members face stress and ambiguity, and when they perceive an
external threat or adversary. It also may be especially potent when a project team is comprised
of members from different organizations. The absence of a single entity with overall managerial
responsibility in these cases may make it harder to prompt group members to view things from
the standpoint of a broader organizational mission.
The large-firm lawyer thus practices under conditions dramatically different from a quarter
century ago. Firms are more loosely organized, partners are more akin to individual entrepre-
neurs, and competition is a relentless fact of life. These changes have been especially vivid at Wall
Street firms, because they were the most insulated from competitive pressures for a good part of
the twentieth century. All large firms, however, now inhabit a universe whose governing laws are
those of the market.”70
That competitive, never-say-die atmosphere was clear, and Gellene’s behaviour was consis-
tent with that ethic as he began work on the Bucyrus case:
“Gellene . . . told Lederman, ‘I don’t believe that we have to disclose that we represent Salovaara
because he’s not a creditor.’ Gellene testified that he had thought of Salovaara when preparing
the declaration, but had told himself that ‘it’s not related and he’s not even a creditor.’ The lat-
ter conclusion apparently was based on the view that Salovaara individually was not someone to
whom Bucyrus owed money. Gellene didn’t share his reasoning on this issue with anyone else at
the time, because ‘we were in the middle of this fire drill to get everything done, and everybody
was off doing something else. There was so much work to be done that everybody had to work
on one thing and not really look at what somebody else was doing’.”71
Although it’s possible that Gellene’s failure to push the disclosure of the Salovaara relation-
ship was part of some “nudge-nudge, wink-wink”72 signalling from Lederman, Gellene was
a partner at the time, and he was certainly capable of understanding that bankruptcy courts
prefer to decide conflicts issues themselves, after full disclosure. Gellene was experienced
enough to know that he
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“had an ongoing obligation during the bankruptcy proceeding to inform the court if the firm
developed new ties with any claimant. In asserting that Milbank had no connections to any party
in interest other than those listed in his affidavit, Gellene already had crossed a crucial divide.
To put it bluntly, he had lied to the court.”73
He may have rationalised that lie on the grounds that everyone was feverishly busy with
Bucyrus’s first-day motions (cognitive dissonance thus rearing its ugly head), but he lied,
nonetheless. And that lie, coupled with more lies and a cover-up, eventually sent him to
prison. Would Gellene have lied about the conflict had he been working at a slower-paced
law firm, or on a smaller case, or if he were a rainmaker on his own, not dependent on 
others’ largesse for his assignments? It’s hard to say. Those factors operated to make the 
decision to lie more likely, though.
III. Conclusion: The Inevitability of Human Nature
Outside of most Perry Mason episodes, guilty people don’t confess until they’ve been caught.
After the jury verdict in the Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling cases, both defendants acted as if the
verdicts were based on a simple factual misunderstanding:
“Speaking to reporters outside the courthouse, Lay expressed shock at the verdict and continued
to maintain his innocence as his wife Linda stood by his side.
‘I firmly believe I am innocent of the charges,’ he said. ‘Despite what has happened I’m still
a very blessed man.’ . . . 
Outside the courtroom after court was adjourned, Skilling said, ‘We fought a good fight. Some
things work. Some things don’t.’
‘Obviously I’m disappointed, but that’s the way the system works,’ he added.”74
Each man stayed in character, with Lay maintaining that his inattention75 and Fastow’s greed
caused Enron’s downfall, and Skilling maintaining that ordinary people76 couldn’t under-
stand why Enron entered into such creative deals.
Gellene also had a theory for his downfall: a combination of his perfectionism and his inac-
tion. Starting with his failure to finish his bar application, he explained:
“I think I have two things to say. First, is that I have not just for my adult life but before that
I’ve been recognized as a person with gifts in terms of my intellect and my ability to deal with
problems, and I’ve been very good and very competent at the kinds of problems presented [by]
my clients in the practice of law and in academics and so on.
And that is I think such a part of me and who I hold myself out to be and who I am that when
I am confronted with mistake, an act of inadvertence that is stupid that I’m—it is very difficult
for me to stand up and say I did a stupid thing.
When I was a young lawyer, I did a very stupid thing. I got caught up in my work and I did-
n’t fill out the forms, and as time went on it got more and more absurd and I could not stand
up and say, I did something stupid. And when that first happened in my life in a traumatic way,
I could not say it to myself and I could not say it to others so I hid it. I lied, and when it was
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discovered, I set about to repair it. It was a long process. Nine years ago it would have taken
three weeks and it took almost a year later but I fixed it and moved on.
When I did that with the state court, I didn’t do it with the federal court, the other major
court in New York City and I should have done that. And it would have been—certainly after
the year that went on in my life with the New York bar, it would have been a very simple thing
to do, but I was confronted again with the absurd stupidity of not filling out forms that thou-
sands of lawyers fill out year in and year out and I couldn’t stand up and say, I did this. I did
something stupid so I didn’t do it.”77
Seeing a pattern in his own inaction, Gellene continued, in an effort to explain his actions
in Bucyrus:
“When I saw the [Bucyrus] papers in December, the same crushing weight of what I had expe-
rienced in May occurred again and it occurred at the culmination of a year that was personally
and professionally very difficult and had created a sense of isolation from my colleagues, from my
work, from things that I had invested thousands of hours in trying to give meaning to myself and
to my life and I could not deal with it. I just fell apart during the month of December. I didn’t
work. I didn’t do anything. I would sit at my desk.
And only when I absolutely had to did I zip up all of that and for whatever time it took put
a face before the world that didn’t reveal what was going on with me. I did that and I’ve done
that because through my adult life I have not been able to deal in a responsible and mature and
forthright way with the imperfections that I like anyone else have and the shortcomings that I
think any man or woman has in a world that’s not perfect.”78
More interesting than Gellene’s self-psychoanalysis, though, is his rather offhand comment,
“on the one hand, you can see this pattern of behavior”.79 On this point, Gellene was absolutely
correct. Milbank could have seen this pattern of behaviour, had the right people connected
the right dots. Although people saw Gellene’s behaviour with respect to timesheets and
workaholism, that behaviour was normal enough not to trigger any alerts. By the time the
abnormal behaviour surfaced, in the guise of a motion to disgorge, it was too late.
In Enron’s case, as well as in Milbank’s case, misbehaviour was an open secret. No matter
how much Andy Fastow, or Jeff Skilling, or Ken Lay fooled themselves, others witnessed
their machinations, and very few of them spoke out. Neither Enron nor Milbank did any-
thing “in the night-time”.
Some may argue that neither group spoke out because it was well-fed (read: greedy), but
I hesitate to attribute simple greed as the sole answer. Using greed as the answer implies that
the problem is cured when the guilty are spirited away.
Rather, I attribute the cause as the mind’s ability to fool itself, not just in discrete circum-
stances, but for a prolonged period. Enron’s workforce, as well as Milbank’s workforce, was
socialised to expect certain behaviour—“work hard, play hard”—and certain consequences,
such as interesting deals and a very comfortable standard of living. There weren’t counter-
examples valuing those who played by the rules. If the only myths of an organisation involve
overwork, outsmarting the opposition, and pushing the envelope, then few inside that organ-
isation will be able to withstand the pressure to conform. Those who want a different envir-
onment will leave. Those who stay will continue to be swayed by the group’s norms.
“Do nothing in the night-time?” Actually, that’s not curious at all.
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